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INTERESTED DIRECTOR CONTRACTS AT
COMMON LAW:
VALIDATION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
Norwood P. Beveridge*
I. INTRODUCTION
Until fairly recently, corporate governance circles generally ac-
cepted the idea that interested director contracts were prohibited at
common law.' This notion resulted from an influential 1966 article
by Professor Harold Marsh, Jr., which concluded that in 1880, con-
tracts between a corporation and its directors were absolutely void-
able at the option of the corporation or its shareholders without re-
gard to the fairness or unfairness of the transaction.2 Marsh also
claimed that the rule applied to contracts between corporations that
shared even a minority of their directors in common. 3 He further
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University, A.B.,
LL.B. Harvard University; LL.M., New York University. Professor Beveridge
is a member of the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Gov-
ernance, a former member of the American Bar Association Committee on
Corporate Law Departments, and a former chief legal officer of a New York
Stock Exchange-listed manufacturing corporation.
1. See, e.g., A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.01 Reporter's Note 3 at 207 (1994) (stating that
transactions were once voidable without regard to fairness).
2. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict oflnterest and
Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36 (1966). Before the publication of
Marsh's article, the view that director contracts were voidable regardless of
fairness was considered to be a discredited minority opinion. See C. T.
Drechsler, Annotation, Right of Corporate Officer to Purchase Corporate As-
sets from Corporation, 24 A.L.R.2D 71, 99-100 (1952); HENRY WINTHROP
BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 67 (rev. ed. 1946); 4
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2346 (1918).
3. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 37.
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stated that it did not matter if a majority of so-called "disinterested"
directors approved a contract.4 Finally, he claimed to have found
only one case during this period which was contrary to the general
rule.5 He then concluded that "this principle, absolutely inhibiting
contracts between a corporation and its directors . . . [which] ap-
peared to be impregnable in 1880," had inexplicably disappeared by
1910;6 it was replaced by a rule that such contracts were valid if fair
and approved by a disinterested majority of the board.7
Marsh's contention that contracts between a director and the
corporation were generally prohibited at common law came under
attack in 1992 as completely erroneous.8 This suggestion has been
met with a good deal of interest,9 but not with a corresponding
4. See id.
5. See id. at 38. The case was Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Credit
Mobilier of America, 135 Mass. 367 (1883), which held that an interested di-
rector contract could not be disaffrmed by the corporation in the absence of
actual fraud once it had been assigned in good faith to a third party with ap-
proval of the corporation's board of directors, even though that third party, also
a corporation, might have directors and shareholders in common with the first
corporation. See id. at 377-78. This was not, however, the only case contrary
to Marsh's "general rule." See, e.g., Ft Payne Rolling Mill v. Hill, 54 N.E.
532 (Mass. 1899) (holding that a fair contract with a director, made by other
directors, cannot be avoided by a receiver); Nye v. Storer, 46 N.E. 402, 403-04
(Mass. 1897) (upholding an interested director contract which had been ap-
proved by a majority of the shareholders, even though the interested directors
voted in their capacity as shareholders); Kelley v. Newburyport & A. H. R.
Co., 6 N.E. 745, 748-49 (Mass. 1886) (enforcing an interested director contract
where the shareholders' inaction, with knowledge of the facts surrounding the
contract, constituted a waiver of their right to object).
6. Marsh, supra note 2, at 39.
7. See id. at39-40.
8. See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fi-
duciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transac-
tion, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 659-62 (1992) (stating that interested director
contracts were not always voidable at common law).
9. See Solomon v. Armstrong, No. CIV.A.13515, 1999 WL 182569, at *8
n.48 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1999); LEWIs D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND POLICY 755-56 (4th ed. 1998); WILLIAM L. CARY & MELvIN ARON
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 650-51 (7th ed. unabr,
1995); Dennis J. Block et al., The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the
Scope of Judicial Review, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 65, 76 n.50 (1993); Daniel B.
Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Possession: "Don't
Look Back - Something May Be Gaining on You ", 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 155,
168 n.53 (1994); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate
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degree of acceptance.' 0 The subject of the corporate director fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty is now as contentious as ever." Therefore, since
an understanding of the origins of the existing system of regulation
will be helpful,'2 the purpose of this Article is to set out at some
length the general rules for validation of interested director contracts
at common law. Part II discusses the authorities that demonstrate
that there was no doctrine of absolute voidability prior to 1910, as
Professor Marsh suggested. It then demonstrates that courts ad-
dressed concerns about directors taking advantage of their positions
under the doctrines of fraud or constructive fraud. Part EII analyzes
the case law to demonstrate when courts would or would not apply
those doctrines to render an interested director contract voidable.
Part IV concludes that there is no difference between allowing
Law, 38 B.C. L. REv. 595, 613 n.43 (1997); William J. Carney, The ALI's
Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights?, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 898, 927-28 & n.157 (1993); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Approval
by Disinterested Directors, 20 J. CoRp. L. 215, 219-20 & n.20 (1995); Mat-
thew G. Dor6, Presumed Innocent? Financial Institutions, Professional Mal-
practice Claims, and Defenses Based on Management Misconduct, 1995
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 127, 181 & n.197; Matthew G. Dor6, Statutes ofLimita-
tion and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle Ground on the
Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 695, 742 n.175 (1997); Park
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-
Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 230-32
(1997); Douglas C. Michael, The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty as a
Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensation, 17 J. CORP. L. 785,
803-04 nn.96 & 99 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About
Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-of-Interest Transactions and the ALI's
Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 954, 954 n.1,
970 n.79 (1993); Mary A. Jacobson, Note, Interested Director Transactions
and the (Equivocal) Effects of Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L.
981, 981 n.2, 989 n.30 (1996); Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a
Havenfor Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 982 n.114 (1995).
10. See CARY & EIsENBERG, supra note 9, at 650-51 (concluding that a
clear majority of the early cases support Marsh, although a few cases and the
leading treatises of the time support Beveridge); Brudney, supra note 9, at 613
n.43 (stating that "there is no doubt that [the prohibition] was pervasive, par-
ticularly in industrial states").
11. See sources cited supra note 9.
12. The debate over the historical common law rule regarding self-
interested director contracts has continuing relevance. For instance, it has been
argued that the belief in an absolute common law prohibition against such
contracts has led to the unnecessary development of mechanical rules in sub-
stitution of sound fiduciary analysis. See Beveridge, supra note 8, at 688.
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interested director contracts that are fair to survive the doctrine of
constructive fraud and simply allowing fair contracts in the first
place.4
3
II. INTERESTED DIRECTORS COULD CONTRACT WITH THEIR
CORPORATIONS IN THE NiNETEENTH CENTURY ABSENT FRAUD OR
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the law permitted a
corporation to enter into contracts with its members (shareholders)1
4
and directors.' 5 For example, in Rogers v. Danby Universalist Soci-
ety,' 6 the court held that two of the three corporate trustees could
contract with the third trustee for services and expenditures made by
him in connection with the construction of a meeting house.17 This
would be subject only to proof of "[p]artiality . . . so gross as to
amount to fraud," which would defeat the contract.' 8 Similarly, the
court in an earlier Georgia case denied stockholders an injunction in
their suit to prohibit bank directors from purchasing treasury stock of
the bank, which they proposed to sell on behalf of the corporation. 19
In doing so, the court held that the directors were not trustees in any
sense that would prohibit them from purchasing the stock of the cor-
20poration.
In another case, lien creditors complained that directors of a
corporation, liable as endorsers on its notes, had mortgaged corporate
13. For purposes of this discussion, the year 1910 will generally be used as
the ending point since that was the year Professor Marsh suggested as the be-
ginning of the new era of non-prohibition. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 3 9-40.
14. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 168-69 (2d ed. 1843).
15. Seeid. at214.
16. 19 Vt. 187 (1847).
17. See id. at 192-93.
18. Id. at 191; see also Stark Bank v. United States Pottery Co., 34 Vt. 144,
148 (1861) (holding that a question of fact existed in a creditor's suit against
the corporation on an assumed debt as to whether interested directors acted in
good faith in causing the corporation to assume personal liability of one direc-
tor for which the others were liable as endorsers).
19. See Hartridge v. Rockwell, R.M. Charlton 260 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1828).
20. See id. at 265.
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property to themselves as security against that liability.21 The court,
however, noted that there was no objection to such a mortgage:
Now there is nothing, either in law or equity, which forbids
a member, or even a director, of a corporation, from con-
tracting with it, and like any other individual, he has a right
to prescribe his own terms, which the corporation are at lib-
erty to accept or reject, and when the contract is concluded,
he stands in the same relation to the other creditors of the
corporation, as any other individual would under the same
circumstances.22
Similarly, a Massachusetts court allowed the trustees of a corpo-
ration to authorize the corporate treasurer to give a corporate note to
the administrator of the estate of one trustee.23 There, the members
of the corporation had authorized the board of trustees to erect a
building to serve as a meeting house.24 Subsequently, the trustee at
issue had personally paid an obligation of the corporation arising out
of the construction of the meeting house.25 The trustees' decision to
authorize a note to the administrator was valid even though it was
made five years after the members' initial approval of construction.
26
While directors could deal with their corporations, however,
there was an obvious need to prevent directors from taking unfair
advantage of their positions as director. In his 1966 article, Profes-
sor Marsh stated that the phrase "conflict of interest" did not seem to
denote any precise legal category,27 and the heading "contracts with
interested directors" did not seem adequate to describe all director
self-interest conflicts. 28 In the nineteenth century, the problem of di-
rector self-dealing was not categorized under these headings, but
21. See Central R.R & Banking Co. v. Claghorn, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.)
545, 562 (1844).
22. Id.
23. See Hayward v. Pilgrim Society, 38 Mass. 270 (1838) (holding a corpo-
ration liable on note to director's administrator).
24. See id. at 275.
25. See id. at 272.
26. See id. at 276. The court stated that "[t]here can be no doubt that the
trustees might lawfully change the liability of the society by creating one debt
to pay another, whenever in their opinion it became necessary or expedient"
Id.
27. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 35-36.
28. See id. at 36.
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rather as constructive fraud, or fraud presumed in law.2 9 As stated by
a leading text:
Besides that kind of fraud which consists in misrepre-
sentation, express or implied, there is another which will be
presumed, when parties to a transaction do not stand upon
the equal footing on which parties to a transaction should
stand.3°
If the relation between the parties is one of a fiduciary
nature, transactions between them are watched by a court of
equity with more than ordinary jealousy. The duty of a per-
son who fills a fiduciary position being to protect the inter-
ests which are confided to his care, he may not avail him-
self of the influence which his position gives him for the
purposes of his own benefit, and to the prejudice of those
interests which he is bound to protect.
31
The rule does not, however, go the length of avoiding
all transactions between parties standing in a fiduciary rela-
tion, and those toward whom they stand in such relation.
All that a court of equity requires is, that the confidence
which has been reposed be not betrayed. A transaction
between them will be supported, if it can be shown to the
satisfaction of the court that the parties were, notwith-
standing the relation, substantially at arms' length and on an
equal footing, and that nothing has happened which might
not have happened, had no such relation existed. The bur-
den of proof lies, in all cases, upon the party who fills the
29. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Credit Mobilier of Am., 135 Mass.
367, 379 (1883) ("We are all of opinion, upon the facts found, that the case
does not call for the application of the rule as to constructive fraud, which in a
proper case we should not hesitate to enforce with strictness .... ).
30. WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD AND
MISTAKE 143 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1872) (citation omitted); see
id. at 160-61 (stating that this principle extends to company directors).
31. Id. at 150.
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position of active confidence, to show that the transaction
has been fair.32
As applied to the directors of corporations, the rules against con-
structive fraud did not mean that a director could never make a profit
from his position; rather, they meant only that he could not make a
secret profit from it.33 As stated in a leading text:
His duty is not to avoid, wholly, the doing of anything for
his own benefit; for the class of trustees we are considering,
the directors of corporations, are generally interested in the
subject-matter of the trust.34
In the absence of informed consent by or on behalf of the corpo-
ration, the transaction was fraudulent as a matter of law and might be
voided by the corporation regardless of the fairness or unfairness of
the contract.35 Thus, where directors were personally interested in
contracts which they had authorized on behalf of the corporation, the
contracts were voidable at the option of the corporation.36 Therefore,
32. Id. at 151; see also 1 JAIRUS WARE PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 248-49 (2d ed. 1874) (stating that the same rules
apply to contracts of directors with the corporation as to contracts with other
fiduciaries).
33. See SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, THE LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND
OTHER OFFICERS AND AGENTS OF CORPORATIONS 360 (1880).
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. See HENRY 0. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS 581-85 (2d ed. 1888); 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 489-90 (2d ed. 1886).
36. See McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 566
(1892) ("A contract of this kind is clearly voidable at the election of the corpo-
ration.... ."); Thomas v. Brownville, 109 U.S. 522, 524 (1883) (stating that no
such contract can be enforced in a court of equity where it is resisted, but
quantum meruit claim allowed); Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651,
657-58 (1880) (holding that a scheme by directors to profit from a contract
they authorized by forming and taking stock in a new company in order to as-
sume the contract was utterly indefensible and illegal; such contracts are un-
lawful attempts by directors to profit at the expense of stockholders and credi-
tors); Davis v. Rock Creek L.F. & M. Co., 55 Cal. 359, 364-65 (1880) (voiding
corporate notes and mortgage executed by interested president and trustee);
Mallory v. Mallory-Wheeler Co., 23 A. 708, 710-11 (Conn. 1891) (voiding
employment contracts approved by directors and officers in favor of them-
selves); European & N. Am. Ry. Co. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277, 278 (1871) (director
executing construction contract had interest in it); Flint & Pere Marquette Ry.
Co. v. Dewey, 14 Mich. 477, 486-87 (1866) (president and trustee had interest
in corporate construction contract authorized by him).
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because absolute voidability was not the rule, the key question was
not merely whether a director was interested in the contract, but
rather whether the particular director-interested contract was or was
not voidable.
I[. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN VOIDABLE AND NON-VOIDABLE
DIRECTOR CONTRACTS
Conceding the fiduciary nature of the directors' relationship to
the corporation and its shareholders, the doctrine of constructive
fraud did not require the avoidance of all contracts between the cor-
poration and its directors. According to accepted principles, such
contracts might be proper where disinterested and informed consent
had been given by or on behalf of the corporation. As stated by a
leading nineteenth century text on equity jurisprudence, the majority
rule on dealings between fiduciaries and the persons they represent
was that not all such contracts were invalid:
There are two classes of cases to be considered, which are
somewhat different in their external forms, and are gov-
erned by different special rules, and which still depend upon
the single general principle. The first class includes all
those instances in which the two parties consciously and
intentionally deal and negotiate with each other, each
knowingly taking a part in the transaction, and there results
from their dealing some conveyance, or contract, or gift.
To such cases the principle literally and directly applies.
The transaction is not necessarily voidable, it may be valid;
but a presumption of its invalidity arises, which can only be
overcome, if at all, by clear evidence of good faith, of full
knowledge, and of independent consent and action. The
second class includes all those instances in which one party
purporting to act in his fiduciary character, deals with him-
self in his private and personal character, without the
knowledge of his beneficiary, as where a trustee or agent to
sell, sells the property to himself. Such transactions are
voidable at the suit of the beneficiary, and not merely pre-
sumptively orprimafacie invalid.37
37. 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
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A. Voidable vs. Non-Voidable Director Contracts: The New York
Courts
Just after the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the House of
Lords in England decided Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros. ,38 a
case which greatly influenced the development of the law on direc-
tor-corporation contracts in the United States. In Blaikie Bros.,
Thomas Blaikie was both the managing partner of Blaikie Brothers,
iron founders in Aberdeen, and the chairman of the board of directors
of the Aberdeen Railway Company.39 While he was acting as chair-
man, Blaikie "entered into a contract on behalf of the Company with
his own firm, for the purchase of a large quantity of iron chairs at a
certain stipulated price.",40  In Scotland and England at that time,
statutes applicable to companies incorporated by special act of Par-
liament provided that no person interested in a contract with the
company would be qualified to be a director, and any director who
entered into such a contract was deemed to have vacated his office as
director.4x In this case, however, the court based its decision on the
480 (1886). Some authorities believed that the rule of avoidability without re-
gard to fairness should be the same in all cases involving dealings by a trustee
with trust property, as opposed to dealings by other fiduciaries. See Hoffman
SteamCoal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456, 506-07 (1860); 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 311 (13th ed.
1886).
38. 149 Rev. Rep. 32 (H.L. 1854) (appeal taken from Scot).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 40.
41. See Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., ch. 16,
§§ 85-86 (Eng.); 8 & 9 Vict, cl. 17, §§ 88-89 (Scot). The text of the statutes
reads:
85/88. No person shall be capable of being a Director unless he be a
Shareholder, nor unless he be possessed of the prescribed Number, if
any, of Shares; and no Person holding an Office or Place of Trust or
Profit under the Company, or interested in any Contract with the
Company, shall be capable of being a Director; and no Director shall
be capable of accepting any other Office or Place of Trust or Profit
under the Company, or of being interested in any Contract with the
Company, during the Time he shall be a Director.
86/89. If any of the Directors at any Time subsequently to his Elec-
tion accept or continue to hold any other Office or Place of Trust or
Profit under the Company, or be either directly or indirectly concerned
in any Contract with the Company, or participate in any Manner in the
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common law rather than the effect of the statute.42 The Lord Chan-
cellor stated that the question presented was "whether a director of a
Railway Company is or is not precluded from dealing on behalf of
the Company with himself, or with a firm in which he is a partner.
A3
Holding that the fairness of the contract was no defense, the court
decided that the contract could not be enforced. 44
1. The Cumberland Coal and Iron Company cases
Another influential case during this time was Cumberland Coal
& Iron Co. v. Sherman,45 decided by the New York Supreme Court
at Special Term on a motion for an injunction. From 1855 to 1858,
the defendant Sherman was a director of the plaintiff corporation, a
member of its executive committee, and chair of a special committee
of the board empowered to make recommendations regarding the
disposition of certain coal properties of the company.46 With the ap-
proval of the Board of Directors, the corporation sold a portion of the
coal lands to Mr. Sherman in 1856; at the same time, the company
entered into a contract with him for the use of the railroad and other
property of the company. 47 The shareholders of the company subse-
quently approved the deed and contract at a shareholders' meeting in
1857.48 Following Mr. Sherman's resignation in 1858, the corpora-
tion brought suit to nullify the transactions, alleging that the terms of
the sale and contract were grossly unfair.49 The court, however, did
not rest its decision on the grounds of unfairness, although it did rule
Profits of any Work to be done for the Company, or if such Director at
any Time cease to be a Holder of the prescribed Number of Shares in
the Company, then in any of the Cases aforesaid the Office of such Di-
rector shall become vacant, and thenceforth he shall cease from voting
or acting as a Director.
This statute did not, however, serve as a model for American legislatures,
which followed quite a different approach. See Beveridge, supra note 8, at
662-70.
42. See Blaikie Bros., 149 Rev. Rep. at 37-3 9.
43. Id. at 39.
44. See id. at 39, 46.
45. 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
46. See id. at 554-55.
47. See id. at 556.
48. See id. at 558.
49. See id. at 554-57.
[Vol. 33:97
November 1999] INTERESTED DIRECTOR CONTRACTS 107
that the fairness of the transaction was no defense:50 The court stated
that the directors were incapable of ratifying a contract with a mem-
ber of the board,5 and it found the shareholders' approval of the
contract ineffective because the shareholders were uninformed of the
facts and because any approval by shareholders needed to be unani-
mous to bind the company.5 2 The court therefore enjoined any trans-
fer or use of the properties and contract
53
While the Cumberland decision was widely cited, its conclu-
sions did not become generally accepted as law. In fact, the decision
did not even finally determine the rights of the parties. The courts of
Maryland ultimately decided the matter since both the real estate and
the Hoffman Steam Coal Company, to whom Sherman had trans-
ferred the land, were located in Maryland. In Hoffman Steam Coal
Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co.,54 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that it was immaterial whether the contract and convey-
ance were regarded as voidable without regard to fairness or voidable
only for lack of bona fides, since the transaction could not be sus-
tained under either view.55 Although the defendants claimed that the
transaction had been ratified by a majority vote of the stockholders,
the court in a later opinion held that the ratification was insufficient
because it had not been made with full knowledge of the law and
facts.
5 6
The Hoffman opinions are ambiguous and could be read to sup-
port a rule of voidability in spite of fairness.5 7 However, in a subse-
quent Maryland case involving Sherman and Cumberland, the court
soundly rejected such a rule of absolute voidability.5 8 In that case,
Cumberland had given Sherman a mortgage on certain real property
owned by the corporation. 59 The court held that the transaction
50. See id. at 579.
51. See id. at 563-64, 573.
52. See id. at 576-77.
53. Seeid. at580.
54. 16 Md. 456 (1860).
55. See id. at 506-07.
56. See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117, 153 (1863).
57. See Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 261 A.2d 156, 157-58 (Md.
1970) (stating that these two decisions seem to favor a rule of voidability re-
gardless of the question of fairness to the corporation).
58. See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 (1875).
59. See id. at 599.
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should be voided, not without regard to fairness, but because Mr.
Sherman and his assignee had not established "the perfect fairness,
adequacy, and equity of the transactions upon which the mortgage
professes to be based., 60 They failed to meet that burden because
there was no proof that the mortgage had been authorized by an in-
formed vote of the stockholders, that all of the directors approved the
mortgage,' or that the supposed loan secured by the mortgage had
ever been made or was then due and unpaid.6 2
Having rejected the principle of voidability without regard to
fairness in interested director transactions, the courts of Maryland
later held in Booth v. Robinson,63 a stockholders' derivative action,
that a presumption of unfairness or illegality does not arise with re-
spect to dealings between two corporations having a minority of their
directors in common. 64  In that situation, the court held that the
common directors must be shown to have been guilty of active mis-
conduct in order to fix personal liability upon them.6 5  Similarly,
where no actual fraud or illegality was shown in a suit brought by aminority shareholder, the Maryland courts also declined to enjoin a
contract between two corporations under the control of the same
60. Id. at 607. The defendant Ann Parish was Mr. Sherman's sister-in-law.
See id. at 602. The rule in the Parish case put the burden of proof on the inter-
ested director to establish fairness. See Rodman, 261 A.2d at 157-58 (quoting
Parish, 42 Md. at 605-06). Under Maryland law, transactions between a fidu-
ciary and the person represented were not necessarily invalid but might be
avoided if the fiduciary could not prove fhimess. See Pairo v. Vickery, 37 Md.
467, 484-85 (1873) (trustee and cestuis que trust).
61. See Parish, 42 Md. at 610.
62. See id. at 612-13.
63. 55 Md. 419 (1880).
64. See id. at 441; accord United States Rolling Stock Co. v. Atlantic &
Great W. R.R Co., 34 Ohio St 450, 466 (1878):
We have not, upon the most diligent research, been able to find a case
holding a contract made between two corporations by their respective
boards of directors invalid, or voidable at the election of one of the
parties thereto, from the mere circumstance that a minority of its board
of directors are also directors of the other company. Nor do we think
such a rule ought to be adopted.
Cf Goodin v. Cincinnati & Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169 (1868) (in-
validating transfer of corporate property to majority shareholder by directors at
grossly inadequate price).
65. See Booth, 55 Md. at 441-42.
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majority shareholder.66 A minority shareholder could, however,
maintain an action to restrain a majority shareholder's self-dealing
by alleging actual fraud or illegal or ultra vires acts.67
The New York Cumberland decision,68 like its Maryland coun-
terpart,69 failed to become the law of the state for a number of rea-
sons. The surface appeal of a prophylactic rule conflicted with ex-
isting corporate law and masked underlying difficulties and
inequities. For example, the idea of unanimous shareholder ap-
proval70 came from the law of trusts.7 ' This idea, however, did not
fit the law of corporations, which required unanimous consent of
shareholders only for extraordinary transactions. 72 No later case en-
dorsed this idea of unanimous shareholder ratification.
The idea that the directors could not approve a transaction in-
volving a member of the board also found its roots in the law of
trusts. The Sherman court, for example, cited Whichcote v. Law-
rence, which held that a purchase of lands by a trustee for the bene-
fit of creditors-although approved by three other trustees, one of
whom was solicitor for the trust-did not adequately protect the trust
66. See Shaw v. Davis, 28 A. 619, 625-26 (Md. 1894) (court will not sec-
ond guess the wisdom of a lease between two corporations controlled by the
same individuals).
67. See Sloanv. Clarkson, 66 A. 18, 20-21 (Md. 1907).
68. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct
1859).
69. Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456
(1860).
70. See Sherman, 30 Barb. at 575-77.
71. See id. at 575-76. The court quoted with approval from a treatise on the
law of trusts: "When the cestuis que trust are a class of persons, as creditors,
the sanction of the major part will not be obligatory on the rest; but the confir-
mation to be complete, must be the joint act of the whole body." Id. (quoting
THOMAS LEwIN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS 403
(1858)); see also Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 267-68 (N.Y. Ch.
1816) (the leading case in New York on the subject of trustee self-dealing at
that time).
72. See People v. Ballard, 32 N.E. 54, 59 (N.Y. 1892) (holding that non-
consenting shareholders can object to termination of corporate life by sale of
all of its assets); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 590-93
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (holding that directors cannot terminate corporation's
business even with consent of a majority of the stockholders).
73. See Shennan, 30 Barb. at 573 (quoting Whichcote v. Lawrence, 30 Eng.
Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1798)).
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beneficiaries. 74 The notion that directors could not approve a con-
tract involving a member of the board did have some appeal; it was
not consistent, however, with existing practices in corporate man-
agement to insist that the stockholders approve contracts in the ordi-
nary course of business. Unlike trustees, directors were usually
shareholders and therefore beneficiaries of their own fiduciary du-
ties. 75 Since directors were elected by a majority vote of sharehold-
ers, usually the same persons, or their nominees, would be present at
a shareholders' meeting as at a board meeting.
However, early cases agreed that the board could not approve its
own contracts.76 Since the essence of the trust doctrine was a con-
cern with self-dealing, a director was viewed as standing on both
sides of the transaction where the director's vote was necessary for
board approval of the director's contract. Thus, where the company
secretary and treasurer, a member of the board, attended a meeting of
the board at which his presence was necessary to a quorum, the
board could not approve payment of compensation to him, and the
directors were held personally liable for the payment in a sharehold-
ers' suit.7 7 Also, directors could not enforce a contract against their
corporation where they constituted a majority of the board and then
approved a contract to pay themselves $200,000 as individuals for
the assignment of a grant to construct a railroad. The contract was
accordingly not enforceable by them in a suit against the corpora-
tion.78
74. See Whichcote, 30 Eng. Rep. at 1254 ("I am sorry to say, there is
greater negligence, where there is a number of trustees. But it is the duty of a
trustee to correct the negligence, which the number of trustees may occa-
sion."); see also Shelton v. Homer, 46 Mass. 462, 468 (1843) (holding that one
executor cannot sell estate lands to a co-executor, even if he resigns).
75. See 1 MORAWETZ, supra note 35, at 474.
76. See sources cited supra note 36.
77. See Butts v. Wood, 37 N.Y. 317 (1867); Atlanta Hill Gold Mining &
Milling Co. v. Andrews, 23 N.E. 987 (N.Y. 1890) (allowing a corporation to
recover salary paid to president pursuant to board resolutions at meetings at
which he presided); Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 109 N.Y.S. 760 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1908) (voiding salaries fixed by interested directors in shareholders'
derivative suit), modified on other grounds, 110 N.Y.S. 806 (N.Y. App. Div.
1908).
78. See Colemanv. Second Ave. ILR. Co., 38 N.Y. 201 (1868).
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While the law of trusts gave rise to the rule preventing directors
from voting on their own contracts, the duty of loyalty prevented a
director from acquiring an interest in property adverse to the corpo-
ration. Thus, a director hired to procure rights of way for a railroad
company could not acquire and enforce against the company a lease
to premises on which the railroad had built tracks and trestle works.7 9
The duty of loyalty, however, did not prohibit all transactions
relating to property interests. For example, directors were frequently
creditors of their corporations and could make and enforce loans and
advances, as well as take security for unpaid debts. 80 Since the right
of the corporation to avoid the transaction could not be exercised in
equity without returning the consideration received, the rule of void-
ability could not apply to the giving of security, even for an antece-
dent debt, because payment of the debt was a prerequisite to avoid-
ance. 81 Thus, where a president and director of a railroad advanced
$81,000 to the company and held its bonds as collateral security, it
was immaterial that the executive committee directors who author-
ized the treasurer's delivery of the bonds were themselves interested
79. See Blake v. Buffalo Creek R.R. Co., 56 N.Y. 485 (1874) (dismissing
suit by director to expel railroad from premises and ordering director to hold
lease for company). On the subject of a director's general duty of loyalty in
not competing with the corporation for business opportunities, see Annotation,
Fairness to Corporation Where "Corporate Opportunity" Is Allegedly
Usurped by Officer or Director, 17 A.L.R.4TH 479 (1982). Cf Rockford,
Rock Island & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Boody, 56 N.Y. 456, 461-62 (1874)
(holding director chargeable with actual fraud in suit by railroad seeking dam-
ages for a secret financial interest he had in a construction contract with the
company).
80. See Duncomb v. New York, Housatonic & N. R.R. Co., 84 N.Y. 190,
198 (1881). Duncomb involved a suit by trustees for bondholders to foreclose
a mortgage of railroad property given to secure bonds. The court found that
the president, who was also a company director, was entitled to prove bonds
held by him to secure a debt due from the railroad for $81,000 with interest.
See id.
81. See id. at 199; cf Paine v. Irwin, 16 Hun. 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1878).
In Paine, the court found that a receiver for the corporation could not rescind a
purchase of land from the trustee since the corporation had constructed a
building on the land, for which the trustee could not be compelled to pay.
Thus, while the receiver could technically void the contract, the lost value of
the improvements would exceed any recovery through rescission and, thereby,
make rescission a losing proposition.
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in the transaction, having guaranteed the company's payment of a
part of the president's advances.8 2
2. The cases involving Edgar Munson
In attempting to support his thesis of absolute voidability, Har-
old Marsh quoted Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning Railway
Co.13 as support for the proposition that a disinterested board of di-
rectors could not successfully approve a contract with another board
member.8 4 A thorough examination of the Munson cases, however,
reveals that while they do exemplify situations in which a director
contract is voidable, they do not support such an inflexible rule of
absolute voidability.
The attempt by Edgar Munson, president, director, and repre-
sentative of the bondholders of the Sodus Bay & Coming Railroad
Company (Sodus Bay), to reorganize the Sodus Bay under new own-
ership produced a number of cases on the rights of interested direc-
tors.85 Sodus Bay was insolvent, in default on the interest payments
on its bonds, and its operations were in suspension. s6 Munson and
two associates, George M. Case and John E. Gowen, entered into a
contract dated August 13, 1875, with George J. Magee, then presi-
dent of the Fall Brook Coal Company (Fall Brook). 7 Under the
contract, Munson would foreclose the mortgage securing the bonds
and transfer Sodus Bay's properties in foreclosure to a new corpora-
tion owned in part by Munson and Magee, of which Munson would
82. See Duncomb v. New York, Housatonic & N. R.R. Co., 88 N.Y. 1, 9
(1882) (holding that the president and director were entitled to enforce bonds
held as collateral where trustees for bondholders attempted to foreclose the
mortgage given to secure the bonds); see also Converse v. Sharpe, 56 N.E. 69,
71 (N.Y. 1900) (holding that it was not improper for directors to take a pledge
of corporate securities to secure loans made to the corporation).
83. 8 N.E. 355 (N.Y. 1886).
84. See Marsh, supra note 2, at 37.
85. See Munson v. Magee, 55 N.E. 916 (N.Y. 1899); Munson v. Syracuse,
G. & C. Ry. Co., 8 N.E. 355 (N.Y. 1886); Harpending v. Munson, 91 N.Y. 650
(1883); Pratt v. Munson, 84 N.Y. 582 (1881); Rudd v. Magee, 65 N.Y.S. 65
(N.Y. App. Div. 1900).
86. See Munson v. Magee, 55 N.E. at 916.
87. The facts and the terms of the contract are most clearly set out in Mun-
son v. Magee, 55 N.E. 916 (N.Y. 1899).
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be president and a director.88 The new company would pay for the
properties by issuing its bonds to the bondholders of the old com-
pany at the price of fifty percent of the face amount of the old
bonds.8 9
With the new company (SG&C) formed, Magee assigned to it
the August 13, 1875 contract, which thereby released him from fur-
ther obligation except for certain undertakings which he duly per-
formed. 90 At a board meeting on August 31, 1875, attended by Mun-
son and Magee, SG&C assumed the August 13, 1875 contract after a
unanimous vote by the directors.9' SG&C then entered into a new
contract with Munson on September 14, 1875, which replaced the
August 13 contract.92  Munson signed the new contract both as a
seller, in his capacity as an individual, and as a buyer, in his capacity
as president of SG&C.
93
After numerous delays, SG&C located an alternate route for its
railroad line, and when Munson tendered Sodus Bay's properties in
88. See id. at 916-17.
89. See id. at 916.
90. See id. at 917. The new company was named the Syracuse, Geneva &
Coming Railroad Company. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 918. Munson ran into difficulties at both ends of the transac-
tion. Following his foreclosure and purchase of the properties, a stockholder
of the old company sued Munson under a New York statute giving railroad
stockholders a right to a pro rata share of the assets bought by a purchaser at a
foreclosure sale of the railroad properties. See Pratt v. Munson, 84 N.Y. 582
(1881). The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute had been re-
pealed by implication as a result of two later statutes on railroad reorganiza-
tion. See id. at 587-88. As such, Munson prevailed in this lawsuit.
Munson also won another suit against him by a stockholder of the old
company. See Harpending v. Munson, 91 N.Y. 650 (1883). The stockholder
alleged that Munson could not purchase the railroad properties at the foreclo-
sure sale since he was also a director of the company. See id. at 652. The
court of appeals held that Munson could enforce his rights as bondholder, in-
cluding foreclosure. The court also held that his title as conceded purchaser at
the sale could not be impeached except as to any equity remaining after pay-
ment of the bonds; such an action should be brought by the company, not a
shareholder of the company. See id. at 653-54; ef Hoyle v. Plattsburgh &
Montreal R.R. Co., 54 N.Y. 314, 329 (1873) (finding it unnecessary to decide
whether director who is purchaser at his own foreclosure sale as execution
creditor may have rights to hold the property absolutely against the company).
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1877, the tender was refused.94 Munson then brought suit against
SG&C for specific performance of the September 14, 1875 con-
tract.95 The court stated that it was unprepared, without further con-
sideration, to find that the original contract of August 13, 1875, was
invalid merely because Munson was a director of the company
whose properties were the subject of the contract.96 However, the
court noted that it was unnecessary to reach that question since Mun-
son brought the suit to enforce the contract of September 14, 1875,
which clearly was unenforceable against the company due to Mun-
son's self-dealing. 97 The court stated that Munson had participated
in SG&C's assumption of the obligation, and it did not matter that
nine other directors had voted to assume the August 13 contract.98
Frustrated in his attempts to hold SG&C to its obligations, Mun-
son then sued Magee for failure to perform the August 13, 1875
contract and won an award of damages. 99 The court of appeals,
however, refused to hold Magee liable, saying that the earlier deci-
sion only held that the September 14 contract was voidable because
Munson, as president of SG&C, had undertaken to contract with
himself as an individual. 00 The earlier decision did not hold that the
August 31 resolution was voidable, but even if it were, the company
did not elect to avoid the assumption of the August 13 contract, only
the September 14 contract.' 0' Therefore, there was an effective no-
vation, and Magee was released from any further obligation under
the August 13 contract, except for the parts that he duly per-
formed.
102
94. See Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co., 8 N.E. 355, 357 (N.Y.
1886).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 356.
97. See id. at 358.
98. See id.
99. See Munson v. Magee, 55 N.E. 916 (N.Y. 1899).
100. See id. at 919.
101. See id.
102. See id. The estate of one of Munson's colleagues, John E. Gowen, as-
signed his interest in the August 13 contract to Robert C. Rudd, who brought
suit against the estate of George J. Magee. See Rudd v. Magee, 65 N.Y.S. 65
(N.Y. App. Div. 1900). Once again, an award of damages to the plaintiff was
set aside on appeal. The court held that Gowen, though not a director of the
new company, had also participated in and affirmed the transactions, which
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After reviewing the twenty-five years of litigation in this dis-
pute, it is hard to see any violation of trust by Munson. Sodus Bay
was hopelessly insolvent, no equity remained for the shareholders in
its properties, and the bondholders were content to take fifty cents on
the dollar. Also, SG&C was formed by Munson's contract with
Magee for the express purpose of taking an assignment of the August
13 contract and purchasing the properties of Sodus Bay to be ac-
quired by Munson at the foreclosure sale. Furthermore, Munson and
Magee negotiated the contract at arms' length.
Ultimately, while the Munson cases demonstrate an instance
where the courts would void interested director contracts, they do not
stand for a rule of absolute voidability. The facts of the case demon-
strate instances where the contracts would have been valid. For in-
stance, all Munson had to do was get SG&C's shareholders to ap-
prove the September 14 contract, which would probably have been a
simple task, or he could have simply stood on the August 13 con-
tract, which he had every right to do. Regarding the August 31 board
meeting, the court of appeals found that there was likely no impro-
priety in Munson's participation since he did not have an interest in
the assumption of the contract. 0 3 That was Magee's problem, since
Magee was already bound by the August 13 contract, and it could
have made no difference to Munson or the bondholders who per-
formed the contract. Finally, the court said that SG&C could not
have avoided its assumption of the August 13 contract without re-
turning to Magee the valuable coal freight contracts which he had
procured for the new company in fulfillment of his contractual obli-
gations. 4 These methods demonstrate ways in which the court
would uphold such director transactions. Thus, the Munson cases do
not stand for an unyielding rule of absolute voidability.
3. The interested director as shareholder
The court of appeals in Munson10 5 cited Aberdeen Railway Co.
v. Blaikie Bros.'0 6 in support of the "great rule of law" against
thereby constituted a novation, effectively releasing Magee from further liabil-
ity. See id. at 68.
103. See Munson v. Magee, 55 N.E. at 919.
104. See id.
105. Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co., 8 N.E. 355 (N.Y. 1886).
106. Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros., 1 Macq. 461, 149 Rev. Rep. 32
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self-dealing. 0 7 However, another English case was also influential
in the development of the law in New York; North-West Transporta-
tion Co. v. Beatty,0 8 a stockholders' derivative suit, was influential
in expressing the right of directors who are also shareholders to vote
their shares in approval of contracts in which they are interested.
There, the corporation's board of directors voted to purchase a
steamer from one of the directors, who was not present at the meet-
ing. 0 9 The shareholders then approved the purchase at a special
meeting, with the interested director casting the deciding vote in his
capacity as shareholder. 110 Reversing the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada that set aside the contract,"' the Privy Council up-
held the director's right to approve and enforce the sale, holding that
to deny him the power to vote on a pure question of policy would be
to allow the minority of the shareholders to control the company. 12
The New York courts followed this rule allowing interested di-
rectors to vote their shares as stockholders in Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co.," 3 also a stockholders' derivative suit. In
(H.L. 1854) (appeal taken from Scot).
107. See Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co., 8 N.E. at 358-59.
108. 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887) (appeal taken from Can.).
109. See id. at 595.
110. See id. at 596-98.
111. See Beatty v. North-West Transp. Co., [1886] S.C.R. 598.
112. See North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589, 601 (P.C.
1887) (appeal taken from Can.). Even without a shareholder vote, the contract
might have been permitted by the company's articles of incorporation. At that
time, it was common for the articles to contain a provision that directors might
have an interest in contracts with the company. See G. LATHOM BROWNE, A
TREATIsE ON THE COMPANIEs ACT, 1862 391 (1867), where the following
form is suggested:
95. No director shall, however, become disqualified for his office as a
director by reason of his being a member of any company, co-
partnership, or firm which shall enter into a contract with, or shall do
any work for this company; but he shall not vote on any such contract
or work, and if he so do, his vote shall be counted as given in the
negative, and not in the affirmative.
Such clauses had been held to allow a director to participate in contracts with
the company. See Costa Rica Ry. Co. v. Forwood, [1901] 1 Ch. 746, aff'g
[1900] 1 Ch. 756; Imperial Mercantile Credit Ass'n (Liquidators) v. Coleman,
(1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 189, rev'g (1871) L.R 6 Ch. 558; 4 WLLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2331
(1918).
113. 25 N.E. 201 (N.Y. 1890).
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Gamble, the New York Court of Appeals upheld a contract under
which a director sold a system of water pipes, which he personally
owned, to his corporation. 1 4 Citing North-West Transportation Co.
with approval, the court held that such a contract, when approved by
a majority of the shareholders, could not be voided without proof of
actual fraud or oppression."' Although the votes of the interested
director as shareholder were not necessary to obtain shareholder ap-
proval in Gamble, the court found nothing wrong with interested di-
rectors voting personal shares in favor of their own contracts." 6
In the second edition of his influential 1886 treatise, Victor
Morawetz commented that in some cases, courts had advanced the
view that, even with the approval of a majority of the board, a direc-
tor could not validly contract with the corporation." 7  However,
Morawetz concluded as follows:
But the weight of authority and of reason appears to indi-
cate that such a contract would be valid .... There is no
necessary impropriety in a contract between a director and
the corporation, if the latter is represented by other agents.
On the contrary, such contracts are, in many instances, the
natural result of circumstances, and are justified by the ap-
proved usages of business men." 8
114. See id.
115. See id. at 202; see also Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 105 N.E.
818, 822 (N.Y. 1914) (holding in a stockholders' derivative suit that majority
shareholders cannot ratify payment of fraudulent salaries to themselves).
116. See Gamble, 25 N.E. at 202; see also Skinner v. Smith, 31 N.E. 911
(N.Y. 1892) (holding in an action by trustee to set aside transfer of corporate
assets that a contract with interested directors is not voidable where all share-
holders approved); Barr v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 26 N.E. 145 (N.Y.
1891) (holding in a stockholders' derivative suit that an interested director
contract is not voidable where all shareholders approved); Van Cott v. Van
Brunt, 82 N.Y. 535 (1880) (holding in a suit by receiver of corporation to set
aside contract by president and director that the contract was not invalid where
all directors and stockholders approved); ef Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 527,
535-36 (1880) (holding that the director, president and majority shareholder
could not acquire an interest in a construction contract with the company, but it
was not improper for him to sell his stock and any other interest he might have
in the contract to others).
117. See 1 MORAWETZ, supra note 35, at 494.
118. Id. at 494-95; see also 1 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 242, at 401-02 (1891) (stating di-
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The validity of this proposition, furthermore, was actually noted
by the New York courts in 1892. Commenting on the language, a
New York Supreme Court Justice said that, unfortunately, this
proposition was in fact the weight of authority in New York."19
While the court in that case held that the director could not enforce
the contract against the corporation, the outcome does not diminish
the court's notation of the general rule allowing director contracts;
the holding was not based solely on the director's status as director,
but rather on the fact that the interested director had presided at the
board meeting that approved the contract. 120 Furthermore, in another
suit brought by a minority shareholder to set aside a contract between
the majority shareholder-a director-and the corporation, the same
court held that a minority shareholder could not void the contract
unless it were unfair to the corporation.1
2 '
rectors may contract with corporation if the directors disclose their positions as
adverse parties and do not influence or control the vote); SEWARD BRICE, A
TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIREs 477-87 (2d ed. 1880)
("[P]rovided all the attendant circumstances are made known, companies and
their directors may validly enter into stipulations permitting the latter to have
private and personal interests in the companies' contracts."). Some earlier
treatises had adopted the holding in Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman,
30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1859), that the board could not approve a contract
with a co-director. See 1 PERRY, supra note 32, at 249.
119. See Beers v. New York Life Ins. Co., 20 N.Y.S. 788, 794-95 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct 1892) (dismissing suit by director to enforce a board approved, post-
resignation, lifetime pension).
120. See id. This was an alternative holding, since the court had already
concluded that the board could not make a contract in consideration of past
services, nor could it make a perpetual contract for services. See id. at 792; see
also Welling v. Ivoroyd Mfg. Co., 44 N.Y.S. 374, 377-79 (N.Y. App.'Div.
1897) (holding in suit by assignee of president and director on contracts for
sale of goods and salary that contracts were invalid since interested director
presided at meetings where they were approved, but allowed recovery for
goods in quantum meruit), affd per curiam, 57 N.E. 1128 (N.Y. 1900); An-
derton v. Aronson, 3 How. Pr. (n.s.) 216, 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1886) (holding in
stockholders' derivative suit that presence of interested director at board
meeting authorizing contract and issuance of stock invalidates vote).
121. See Strobel v. Brownell, 40 N.Y.S. 702, 704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1895)
(holding no rule of law forbids a director from making a contract with the cor-
poration). The Strobel case is cited favorably in Hine v. Lausterer, 238 N.Y.S.
276, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930), modified on other grounds, 248 N.Y.S. 806
(N.Y. App. Div. 1931), and affd, 178 N.E. 778 (N.Y. 1931). Hine was a
stockholders' derivative suit where the court undertakes a review of a half
century of interested director law in New York. In Genesee & Wyoming Val-
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4. Contracts between corporations with common directors
In 1884, a lower court judge in New York pronounced the va-
lidity of contracts between corporations with common directors to be
an open question in both New York and federal courts. 122 In that
case, two elevated railroad companies in New York City had, with
the approval of their shareholders, leased all of their properties to a
third elevated railway company. 23 As a result of miscalculations of
the anticipated profits from operations, the terms of the lease were
ruinous to the third company, which thereafter became insolvent.
2 4
Consequently, the boards of directors of the leasing companies
agreed to a reduction in the terms of the lease rentals; they did so,
however, without obtaining shareholder approval.
125
After the election of a new board of directors, one of the leasing
companies brought an action to set aside the new lease on the
grounds that the directors had no authority to modify the lease with-
out shareholder approval, and that three of the directors of the leasing
company were also directors of the lessee.' 26 The court first held
that since the lease covered all of the corporation's properties, the
amendment of the lease constituted a fundamental change in the
business of the corporation, which fell beyond the powers of the
board.' 27 The court then held that although the common directors
made up a minority of the board in each case, their mere presence on
the board gave each company the right to avoid the contract without
regard to fairness.'
28
ley Railway Co. v. RetsofMining Co., 36 N.Y.S. 896 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895), a
suit by one of two related corporations against the other to restrain interference
with a lease, the court refused to set the lease aside on the grounds that the di-
rectors of one were interested in the other, saying that "the rule contended for
by the learned counsel for the defendant has been considerably relaxed of late
years." Id. at 900 (citing Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 25 N.E. 201
(N.Y. 1890)).
122. See Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co. v. Manhattan Elevated Ry. Co., 11
Daly 373, 468 (N.Y.C.P. 1884).
123. See id. at 392-93.
124. See id. at 396-97.
125. See id. at 409-13.
126. See id. at 427-28.
127. See id. at 485.
128. See id. at 524. The court ignored, disagreed with, or distinguished deci-
sions from other states to the contrary. See TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 593
("[I]t has been expressly decided in more than one state... that a contract
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The question of whether a corporation could void a contract
made with another corporation sharing a common director was later
presented in the well-known case of Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas
& Electric Co.129 There, the defendant corporation entered into what
turned out to be very improvident contracts with the plaintiff corpo-
ration. A director of the defendant corporation was also the plaintiff
corporation's president, controlling stockholder, and a member of its
board. 130 In a suit for specific performance, the court of appeals
voided the contracts because the common director failed to warn and
overreached. The contracts were voided even though they had been
adopted at meetings of the defendant's executive committee of the
board at which the plaintiffs president--the dual director-was pre-
sent but did not vote.13' The court said that the refusal to vote did,
however, have importance: "It gives to the transaction the form and
presumption of propriety, and requires one who would invalidate it
to probe beneath the surface.'
32
The New York courts had earlier held that while the presence of
common directors might arguably give each corporation the right to
disavow a common contract, that right could only be exercised by the
corporation through its directors and not by a minority shareholder in
a derivative action. 133 To hold otherwise would allow a minority of
the shareholders to annul a fair contract against the wishes of a ma-
jority of the shareholders.134 A dissident minority shareholder could
not bring an action to avoid the contract without alleging actual,
between two corporations, made by their respective boards of directors, is not
invalidated or rendered voidable... from the mere circumstance that a minor-
ity of [their] board[s] of directors are [in common]."); BEACH, supra note 118,
at 410-11 (stating that contracts between corporations with common directors
are not voidable where a majority of the board are disinterested and there is no
proof of fraud or unfairness); J.P. Massie, Annotation, Validity of Contract
Between Corporations As Affected by Directors or Officers In Common, 114
A.L.R. 299 (1938), supplemented, 33 A.L.R.2D 1060 (1954).
129. 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
130. See id. at 378-79.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 379.
133. See Wallace v. Long Island R.R Co., 19 N.Y. Sup. Ct 460, 463-64
(N.Y. App. Div. 1877) (denying injunction in stockholders' suit seeking to re-
stain agreements between corporations having common directors).
134. See id.
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rather than constructive, fraud.135 Professor Marsh treats this as a
betrayal of the principle of voidability, 136 but as has already been
shown, that supposed principle was only enforced in very limited
circumstances where the same directors were on both sides of the
contract.
137
The New York Court of Appeals upheld this principle of nonin-
tervention in a suit brought by a minority shareholder against a ma-
jority shareholder to cancel the majority shareholder's contract with
the corporation. 138 The court held that the plaintiff was in the same
position as all of the minority stockholders, who cannot interfere
with the honest management of the corporation by the majority
stockholders. 39 It followed from this proposition that even where a
majority of the directors are in common, a majority of the sharehold-
ers may ratify a contract between the two corporations. 40
As already noted, directors could not vote on their own salaries
as officers where the vote of the interested director was necessary to
authorize the payment.14' The court of appeals subsequently held in
a minority shareholder derivative suit that even where the directors
were majority shareholders, they could not, as directors, vote them-
selves salaries as officers. The court cited the following language
with approval:
"A director cannot with propriety vote in the board of di-
rectors upon a matter affecting his own private interest
any more than a judge can sit in his own case; and any
135. See Sage v. Culver, 41 N.E. 513 (N.Y. 1895) (finding that the complaint
in a stockholders' derivative action against directors and majority shareholders
to avoid a contract with a corporation having common directors states a cause
of action when it alleges unfair terms).
136. See MARSH, supra note 2, at 42.
137. See cases cited supra note 36.
138. See Burdenv. Burden, 54 N.E. 17 (N.Y. 1899).
139. See id. at 23.
140. See Continental Ins. Co. v. New York & H. R. Co., 79 N.E. 1026 (N.Y.
1907) (dismissing stockholders' suit seeking to avoid contract between corpo-
rations with a majority of common directors). However, a majority share-
holder could not ratify a fraudulent transaction. See Pollitz v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 100 N.E. 721 (N.Y. 1912); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 99 N.E. 138
(N.Y. 1912) (requiring no demand on stockholders prior to bringing sharehold-
ers' derivative suit since stockholders cannot ratify the alleged fraud).
141. See Butts v. Wood, 37 N.Y. 317 (1867).
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resolution passed at a meeting of the directors at which a di-
rector having a personal interest in the matter voted will be
voidable at the instance of the corporation or the sharehold-
ers, without regard to its fairness, provided the vote of such
director was necessary to the result.',
142
B. Voidable vs. Non-Voidable Director Contracts: The New Jersey
Courts
The experience in New Jersey largely followed the course of the
New York cases. That is to say, there was no mention of the sup-
posed doctrine of absolute voidability of director contracts prior to
1860. The whole idea seems to have been taken directly from the
1854 English case of Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros.143 In
fact, the question of director contracts had been dealt with in the
1832 case of Chandler v. Monmouth Bank,144 where the New Jersey
Supreme Court had held that the board of directors could employ one
of its members as its paid agent to supervise the building of a steam-
boat for the company. 1
45
However, in 1875, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Stew-
art v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.146 that a contract between a direc-
tor and the director's company, even if fair, was voidable at the op-
tion of the company if that option was exercised within a reasonable
time. 147 This right was personal to the company, and did not pass to
the plaintiff in that case, an assignee of the company's interest;
148
142. Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 76 N.E. 1075, 1078 (N.Y. 1906).
The language quoted is mistakenly identified in the opinion as being from the
AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW. See id. It is actually from 10
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 790 (1904). See also Godley v. Cran-
dall & Godley Co., 105 N.E. 818 (N.Y. 1914) (majority shareholders cannot
ratify fraudulent payments to themselves); Billings v. Shaw, 103 N.E. 142
(N.Y. 1913) (directors and officers must account for unlawful profits which
they made in transactions authorized by them as directors).
143. 149 Rev. Rep. 32 (H.L. 1854).
144. 13 N.J.L. 255 (1832). See also Stratton v. Allen, 16 N.J. Eq. 229, 232-
35 (Ch. 1863) (holding that a director may contract with the corporation as a
stranger, but an insolvent corporation cannot make preferential payment to di-
rector as creditor).
145. See Chandler, 13 N.J.L. at 260.
146. 38 N.J.L. 505 (1875).
147. See id. at 521-24.
148. See id. at 524.
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thus, the contract was upheld. The doctrine was further explained in
Gardner v. Butler,149 where minority shareholders sued to avoid
contracts made by the board of directors with the majority share-
holder, Butler, that fixed his compensation. 5 ° The court held the
contracts voidable,15 ' but since Butler was nonetheless entitled to re-
cover upon quantum meruit, and since his services were worth at
least what he had been paid, 52 the court dismissed the suit.
Thus, as in New York, where the directors entered into contracts
with themselves, the contracts could be avoided by the corporation
under New Jersey law. 153 However, even where a majority of the di-
rectors were interested in a contract with the corporation, such a
contract could be ratified by the shareholders, and the votes of the
interested directors as shareholders could be counted to make up the
requisite majority.154 The corollary of this proposition was that an
individual shareholder could not sue to avoid an interested director
contract regardless of its fairness since the decision to bring this
claim was to be made by the shareholders as a group in an assembled
149. 30 N.J. Eq. 702 (1879).
150. See id. at 709.
151. See id. at721.
152. See id. at 725; see also Hickman v. Hickman Hose Coupling Co., 13
N.J.L.J. 111, 112-13 (1890) (stating that a director may recover in quantum
meruit for services as manager).
153. See Kelsey v. New England St. Ry. Co., 48 A. 1001, 1002 (N.J. 1901)
(contract in which directors had a personal interest could not be enforced
against corporation); Hayes v. Pierson, 45 A. 1091 (N.J. 1899) (receiver can
avoid contracts by directors fixing their salaries and contracting with another
company owned by them); Guild v. Parker, 43 N.J.L. 430, 435 (N.J. 1881)
(holding that directors improperly redeemed stock held by them at one hundred
and fifty percent of par when it was redeemable at par); Voorhees v. Nixon, 66
A. 192 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (reforming contract under which wife of controlling di-
rector sold land for $3000 which she had purchased at $450 when it was found
that the husband was the real party to the transaction in question).
154. See Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., 54 A. 1, 4-5 (N.J. 1903) (un-
derwriting contract with J.P. Morgan & Co. upheld as approved by sharehold-
ers). A majority shareholder could not insulate his own salary as an officer
from review by approving it as shareholder. See Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug
Co., 56 A. 254, 256-59 (N.J. Ch. 1903) (stating that the salary must be reason-
able).
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meeting.'55 An individual shareholder could only bring suit upon a
showing that the contract was ultra vires, fraudulent, or illegal.
56
With respect to interlocking directors, a common director could
not be counted towards a quorum for a meeting of the executive
committee to authorize a contract between the two companies.'
57
However, action in reliance upon the contract could ratify the con-
tract, thereby creating an estoppel against objections.' 58 The mere
existence of common directors did not give a minority shareholder
the right to enjoin a contract between the two companies.' 59 The
contract, however, would be enjoined when all of the directors are
shown to have an interest in the transaction which would have the ef-
fect of perpetuating themselves in office.' 60 Minority shareholders
might lose their right to challenge the transaction if, knowing of this
right, they delay in challenging the transaction. Such knowledge and
delay amounts to a defense of laches.1
6 '
155. See Endicott v. Marvel, 87 A. 230, 232 (N.J. Ch. 1913), affd, 92 A. 373
(N.J. 1914).
156. See Endicott, 87 A. at 232-33; see also Marrv. Marr, 70 A. 375, 379-80
(N.J. 1908) (holding that a minority shareholder can set aside purchase by di-
rector at sheriffs sale of corporate property at half its value); Laurel Springs
Land Co. v. Fougeray, 24 A. 499, 503-04 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (holding that a mi-
nority shareholder can set aside tranfers of property and salaries made by ma-
jority shareholder and directors), rev'd on other grounds, 26 A. 886 (N.J.
1893) (receiver will not be appointed); Barry v. Moeller, 59 A. 97, 99 (N.J. Ch.
1904) (compelling directors to account for profits allegedly made by them
when the directors had the corporation sell its products to them below cost);
Oliver v. Rahway Ice Co., 54 A. 460, 461 (N.J. Ch. 1903) (holding that inter-
ested directors cannot purchase stock from themselves at unfair price); Davis
v. Thomas A. Davis Co., 52 A. 717, 718 (N.J. Ch. 1902) (holding that directors
cannot fix their own salaries); Landis v. Sea Isle City Hotel Co., 31 A. 755
(N.J. Ch. 1895) (holding that minority shareholders can reform transaction
where directors purchased land from themselves at a two hundred percent
profit).
157. See Metropolitan Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 A.
907, 910-11 (N.J. 1888).
158. See id. at911.
159. See Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 53 A. 842, 856-57 (N.J.
Ch. 1903).
160. See id. at 858.
161. See Stephany v. Marsden, 75 A. 899 (N.J. 1910).
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C. Voidable vs. Non-Voidable Director Contracts: Other
Jurisdictions
So far, the focus has been on New York and New Jersey cases,
since those jurisdictions are most frequently cited for the supposed
rule of voidability. However, other jurisdictions also enforced fair
interested director contracts during this period. For example, in the
1875 case of Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury162 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld an interested director transaction because the
corporation had waited too long to challenge the action of the defen-
dant director in acquiring the corporation's properties. The director
had obtained the properties at a foreclosure sale under a deed of trust
given by the company to secure a loan from him to the company.
63
However, in language frequently cited, the court also said:
While it is true that the defendant, as a director of the
[c]orporation, was bound by all those rules of conscientious
fairness which courts of equity have imposed as the guides
for dealing in such cases, it cannot be maintained that any
rule forbids one director among several from loaning
money to the [c]orporation when the money is needed, and
the transaction is open, and otherwise free from blame. No
adjudged case has gone so far as this. Such a doctrine,
while it would afford little protection to the [c]orporation
against actual fraud or oppression, would deprive it of the
aid of those most interested in giving aid judiciously, and
best qualified to judge of the necessity of that aid, and of
the extent to which it may safely be given.
164
The lower federal courts also upheld interested director con-
tracts if they were fair, 165 and in other cases, the Supreme Court
162. 91 U.S. 587 (1876).
163. See id..at 593-94.
164. Id. at 589.
165. See Cowell v. McMillin, 177 F, 25, 38-39 (9th Cir. 1910) (minority
shareholder cannot set aside contract with president and director approved by
disinterested directors); Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257, 273 (8th Cir. 1904)
(fair interested director contracts are enforceable in equity and at law and can-
not be avoided by receiver of corporation); Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate-Glass Co.,
57 F. 86, 97 (3d Cir. 1893) (refusing in minority shareholders' derivative suit
to set aside sale of plant to corporation by majority shareholders, officers, and
directors upon approval by majority of minority shareholders); Beach v.
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repeated its approval of transactions involving interested directors
who acted openly and without fraud.
166
The Illinois courts, meanwhile, supported the view that directors
might properly contract with their corporations "in the same manner
as strangers,"' 67 although they would not enforce contracts amount-
ing to constructive fraud. Thus, in Harts v. Brown, 168 the Illinois Su-
preme Court upheld bonds and a trust deed securing the bonds issued
to a director by his co-directors. The court stated:
Did the directors have power to borrow money of one of
their number, and execute to him a mortgage on the corpo-
rate property, with a power of sale? We have never known
it questioned that a director or stockholder may trade with,
borrow from or loan money to the company of which he is
McKinnon, 148 F. 734, 734-36 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (sustaining the demurrer
to the complaint by the receiver of a corporation where no allegation of trans-
fer of property to director without fair consideration); Union Trust Co. of Md.
v. Carter, 139 F. 717, 730-31 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1905) (shareholders' derivative
suit upholding fair sale of corporate property by directors to co-director where
charter provided shareholders' ratification of all non-fraudulent acts by board
of directors); Hubbard v. New York, N.E. & W. Inv. Co., 14 F. 675, 677-79
(C.C.D. Mass. 1882) (dismissing suit by director on contract on ground that
directors cannot make unfair contract with co-directors, although they could
make fair contracts), aff'd on other grounds, 119 U.S. 696 (1887); Combina-
tion Trust Co. v. Weed, 2 F. 24, 26 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1880) (holding that a fair
contract will be enforced in suit by corporation to set aside transfer of collat-
eral to president and director to protect him against guaranty of corporate
notes).
166. See Leavenworth County Comm'rs v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
Co., 134 U.S. 688, 704-08 (1890) (absent actual fraud, the court would not
prevent foreclosure of a trust deed even though the two corporations shared
interlocking shareholders, common directors and officers, and one of the trus-
tees was also a director or stockholder of the company foreclosing the deed);
Illinois Pneumatic Gas Co. v. Berry, 113 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1885) (company
cannot avoid interested director settlement or lease after seven years acqui-
esence; furthermore, settlement was reached previously); Manufacturing Co. v.
Bradley, 105 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1881) (renegotiated bond held by president not
voidable since corporation was represented in transaction by other informed
directors); Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U.S. 13, 21-23 (1877) (where the transaction
was approved by shareholders, the fact that directors were lenders was no ob-
jection to the foreclosure of a mortgage securing bonds).
167. See Merrick v. Peru Coal Co., 61 Ill. 472, 478 (1871) (allowing the
president, director and shareholder to recover on corporate notes).
168. 77 Ill. 226 (1875).
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a member, on the same terms and in like manner as other
persons. 1
69
The court also held, though, that upon foreclosure he could not pur-
chase corporate property in excess of that required to pay the
bonds.'
70
The directors could not, however, enter into contracts with
themselves. During the same term, the Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court decision ordering an accounting of any profits
made by directors under a construction contract, which they had
authorized, with a company in which they subsequently acquired an
interest. 17 1 The court also declared void a majority stock interest in
the railroad which the directors issued to the construction company
for apparently no consideration. 172 No actual fraud was found, but
the court stated that the fairness of the contract was no defense;
173
nor was shareholder approval of the transaction a defense since the
shareholders were unaware that the directors intended to take an in-
terest in the construction company. 1
74
Two Alabama cases that have been cited out of context do not
support any contrary rule, when properly examined. In Memphis &
169. Id. at 230-31; see also Mullanphy Bank v. Schott; 26 N.E. 640, 642 (Ill.
1891) (upholding note and mortgage given to director, stockholder and treas-
urer). However, in later cases, the court held that an insolvent corporation
cannot prefer its directors as creditors ahead of other creditors. See Roseboom
v. Warner, 23 N.E. 339, 341 (Ill. 1890); Beach v. Miller, 22 N.E. 464, 467 (Ill.
1889). These cases reflect the majority rule on that question. See Norwood P.
Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation 's Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary
Duty to Its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY's L.J. 589, 612-14 (1994).
170. See Harts, 77 Ill. at 233-34.
171. See Gilman, Clinton & Springfield .R. Co. v. Kelly, 77 Ill. 426 (1875).
This is consistent with the cases cited supra note 36.
172. See id. at436-37.
173. See id. at 435-36; see also Higgins v. Lansingh, 40 N.E. 362, 381 (Ill.
1895) (holding that fairness was no defense where majority of board was inter-
ested in contract approved by them).
174. See Gilman, 77 Ill. at 437; see also Klein v. Independent Brewing
Ass'n, 83 N.E. 434, 441 (Ill. 1907) (holding that interested majority sharehold-
ers cannot ratify an unfair contract); Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 30
N.E. 667, 670-71 (Il. 1892) (holding that an interested director, officer, and
controlling shareholder cannot, as selling agent, sell all property of the corpo-
ration to himself, nor as controlling shareholder authorize such a sale at a
shareholders' meeting over the objection of the minority).
November 1999]
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Charleston Railroad Co. v. Wood,17 the Alabama Supreme Court
enjoined a railroad company that held a majority of the stock of a
competitor from voting its stock due to multiple acts of actual
fraud. 176 The court relied on the 1886 treatise by Victor Morawetz
for the authority that directors cannot represent conflicting inter-
ests; 177 however, that authority also notes that directors may contract
with the corporation through other directors 178 and are not prohibited
from dealing with another corporation merely because a minority of
the directors are in common.179 Two years later, the same court held,
in O'Conner Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 180
that a creditor cannot object to dealings between a corporation and its
directors and shareholders in the absence of actual fraud.' 8'
The Texas Supreme Court cogently expressed the rationale un-
derlying the rule of allowing a director to contract with the corpora-
tion through fellow directors on fair terms and with full disclosure:
The corporation is a separate entity, for which its board of
directors acts. The persons having the beneficial interest in
the property are the stockholders, but their rights are cen-
tered in the corporation, and are managed and controlled
through the board of directors, as the active representative
of the company; and it is through it, and not the stockhold-
ers, that business dealings are carried on. When a personal
interest of one of them springs up, adverse to that of the
corporation, it disqualifies him to act concerning it as one of
175. 7 So. 108 (Ala. 1889).
176. In a later case, the Alabama Supreme Court said that the Wood result
was reached to prevent a scheme on the part of the majority shareholder to
wreck the competing railroad to build up itself See South & N.A.R. Co. v.
Gray, 49 So. 347, 350-51 (Ala. 1909) (stating that a majority shareholder can-
not vote its stock to oppress and defraud the minority).
177. See Memphis & Charleston R.R. Co., 7 So. at 112 (citing to 1
MORAWETZ, supra note 35, §§ 517, 528-30).
178. See 1 MORAWETZ, supra note 35, § 527.
179. See id. § 530.
180. 10 So. 290 (Ala. 1891).
181. See id. at 292-93 (holding that nothing was wrong with such dealings,
although the corporation and its shareholders may have a right of avoidance in
certain circumstances); see also W.A.E., Annotation, Right of Creditors as
Against Directors or Officers to Whom Property of a Corporation Has Been
Transferred for a Consideration Other Than Payment of Debts Due Them, 9
A.L.R. 1447 (1920).
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the representatives or agents.... But the company is repre-
sented by those who alone can act for it, and, if they are
disinterested, he can, we think, deal with them as any other
trustee can deal with the cestui que trust, if he makes a full
disclosure of all facts known to him about the subject, takes
no advantage of his position, deals honestly and openly, and
concludes a contract fair and beneficial to the company.1
82
Two leading treatises published at the turn of the century stated
that this was the majority rule in the United States at that time:
On the contrary, most of the courts have held that a director
or other officer of a corporation is not precluded from
lending it money and taking a mortgage or other security,
selling it property, or purchasing property from it, or other-
wise contracting or dealing with it, if for the purpose of the
transaction he does not represent the corporation at all, but
it is adequately represented by its other directors or officers,
and the transaction is entirely free from fraud. And by the
weight of authority, a transaction between a director or
other officer and the corporation, or a transaction in which a
director or other officer is interested, is valid, if entirely free
from fraud, even when he has acted as a member of the
board in authorizing the same, if there were enough of dis-
interested votes in favor of the transaction to render his vote
unnecessary.1
8 3
Many courts ... hold that if the interested director took no
part either in the deliberations or in the voting of the board,
but acted in the transaction wholly on his own behalf, the
contract will not be voidable merely because of his official
relation to the company, if the contract be proved affirma-
tively to be fair and honest. Such is, indeed, the prevalent
American doctrine. But even according to these authorities,
the transaction will be closely scrutinized, and the burden
182. Tenison v. Patton, 67 S.W. 92, 95 (Tex. 1902).
183. 3 WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2304-05 (1901).
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of establishing its complete bonafides rests upon the inter-
ested director; and if the interested director, although not
guilty of positive fraud, yet failed to disclose some material
fact, the transaction will be voidable. So too, if the agree-
ment appear to be unconscionable or unreasonable, it will
not be enforceable. 1
84
IV. CONCLUSION
The principle that a contract between the corporation and a
member of its board can be avoided at the option of the corporation
or any shareholder of the corporation regardless of its fairness does
not serve a useful function. If a contract is fair, it is hard to say there
has been a legitimate injury to the corporation. Furthermore, outright
voidability would actually make directors wary of contracting with
their corporations and, thereby, limit the corporation's options in
situations where there may be no alternative to dealing with a direc-
tor. For similar reasons, no useful purpose is served by avoiding fair
contracts between corporations having a minority of common direc-
tors. Thus, avoiding fair contracts that directors honorably and
openly entered into is not an appealing option for the average busi-
nessperson.
In fact, the history of interested-director contracts reflects this
basic concept. The only cases in which corporations sought to in-
voke the principle of absolute voidability have disclosed some dubi-
ous motive, such as a new board of directors seeking to avoid a con-
tract made by their predecessors. 85 The trust principle of voidability
is intended to enforce disclosure to, and consent by, the beneficial
owners of trust property; this idea does not translate well into the
corporate setting. Furthermore, all authorities after the Beatty' 86 de-
cision in 1887 agreed that contracts could be approved by a majority
184. 2 ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 1573, at 1298-99 (1908).
185. This was apparently the fact pattern in three notorious New York cases:
Cumberland Coal &Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859);
Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co. v. Manhattan Elevated R.R. Co., 11 Daly 373
(N.Y.C.P. 1884); Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. Ry. Co., 8 N.E. 355 (N.Y.
1886).
186. North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887) (ap-
peal taken from Can.).
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of the shareholders, including the interested director acting as share-
holder.
Holding a shareholders' meeting, however, takes time and trou-
ble; thus, in the absence of proof of actual fraud or unfairness, basic
business principles support the idea that a shareholders' meeting
should not be required for transactions conducted by a disinterested
board. The board, after all, presumptively reflects the wishes of a
majority of the shareholders. Consequently, fair contracts were gen-
erally enforced, even in New York and New Jersey, through a num-
ber of devices, such as the doctrine of laches, the impracticability of
rescission and the absence of damages, ratification by shareholders,
or perhaps most tellingly, the doctrine that fair contracts could be
avoided only by the board and not by a minority shareholder.
Ultimately, there is no difference between applying these doc-
trines to save interested director contracts that are fair and a straight-
forward doctrine that the board can make a fair contract in the first
place. Thus, when looking to the legal history of this subject for
guidance in either statutory analysis or fiduciary duty analysis, it is
important to realize that there was never a rule that interested direc-
tor contracts were absolutely voidable. A true understanding of the
history of the rule will give needed insight and further the upholding
and enforcement of fair and useful contracts between corporations
and their directors.
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